Introduction
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Following liberation from Japanese colonial rule , the number of tuberculosis patients had increased at an alarming rate. Tuberculosis became the number one cause of death in the late 1940s, killing 100,000
persons annually and infecting nearly one million people out of a total population of twenty million.
2) Controlling the disease, or launching major public health interventions on the national scale, would require financial resources and technical capacities that the government could not deliver on its own. Amidst public outcry over the deteriorating health and living conditions, 3) the prospect of WHO's assistance that would follow South
Korea becoming a member state in 1949 was seen as a "ray of hope shining on future improvements to the state of the public's health." 4) It took more than a decade, however, for WHO to deliver that assistance. War years (Lee, S. H., 2014: 99-126; Kim, J., 2012) . Similarly, Yeo InSeok's article on malaria control under the American military occupation (1945) (1946) (1947) (1948) only alludes to WHO's role in the following years (Yeo, 2015: 35-65). Ku Mi-Jin has examined the tension between international and local experts about the tuberculosis control program (Ku, 2005) (WHO, 2016) . 6) In the body of this paper, the Korean names are presented with the family name placed before the given name, unless the names are commonly used in the other way. For example, the family name of "Lee Sun Ho" is Lee, while that of "Jane S. Kim" is Kim. 7) For a broader reading on the debate between clinical and public health approaches in tuberculosis control, see Sunil Amrith, Decolonizing International Health: India and Southeast Asia, 1930-65 (Springer, 2006) up to the early years of Park Chung Hee's military dictatorship (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) , in order to demonstrate how tuberculosis came to be addressed as a public health problem. Prior to WHO's assistance, tuberculosis control in Korea was limited to basic administrative activities and intermittent vaccination campaigns by the government, complemented by activities offered by individual medical doctors, international aid agencies and missionaries, or the Korean National Tuberculosis Association (KNTA), a voluntary organization comprised of elite medical professionals. Following WHO's technical assistance, however, tuberculosis control activities became centralized as the government expanded and mobilized its network of public health centers in order to deliver diagnostic, preventive, as well as curative services to the public.
In this paper, infrastructure refers to an array of institutional, administrative, organizational, and technological setups that are introduced in order to undergird a specific activity, thereby permitting certain kinds of activities while blocking others (Slota and Bowker, 2017: 530) . Under this definition, infrastructure is not a fixed or closed system but a dynamic entity evolving around the policy imperatives, technological advancements, and political situations in society. Infrastructure is thus inherently relational and context-dependent. This paper argues that a new approach to tuberculosis control introduced by WHO became part of Korea's public health infrastructure by reorienting rather than supplanting over a preexisting one amidst the sociopolitical milieu in the early 1960s that worked favorably for such changes.
The two decades immediately following the end of World War II were an important period for international health as well. Immediately after the war, major donors for health such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the US government, and WHO became awash with enthusiasm for the potential of technological solutions (Farley, 2004: 1; Birn, 2014) . For instance, the discovery of new vaccines, antibiotics, and DDT opened new possibilities for gaining mastery over diseases. WHO began to launch expensive diseasespecific programs such as the Malaria Eradication Program (MEP, 1955) and the Intensified Smallpox Eradication Campaign (1967) (Litsios, 1997; Bhattacharya, 2006) , which historian Randall Packard described as having "eclips[ed] all other health programs" (Packard, 2016: 133) . The promise of WHO's techno-centric mass campaigns allowed for the international community to envision a world where communicable diseases could not only be controlled but eradicated altogether (Williams, 1988; Stepan, 2013: 28-30) , and placed WHO on the map as the new professional authority on promoting global welfare (Birn, 2009 ).
Within WHO, however, there also existed concerns towards the long-term efficacy of such techno-centric, disease-focused programs. Critics warned that although the single-purpose "vertical approach," as it was coined, could yield rapid results for a given health problem, but would only be temporary. As proponents of the "horizontal approach," they argued that WHO should also invest in tackling "overall health problems on a wide front and on a long-term basis through the creation of a system of permanent institutions commonly known as general health services" (Gonzalez, 1965: 9; Mills, 2005) . The two approaches were not mutually exclusive, but tensions escalated between the two camps as strategies became further dichotomized, 8) until the late 1960s when WHO acknowledged that a 8) According to A. E. Birn, the rift between the two approaches became increasingly marked as the debate progressed to extrapolate the vertical versus horizontal dichotomy onto debates about technical versus social, centrally driven versus locally defined, diseasebased versus health-based, individually versus collectively-oriented, doctor-centred robust health infrastructure was an important prerequisite to the success of disease-specific programs (Brown et al., 2006) . WHO began to stress the importance of 'integrating' disease control services into the general health services, and this turn towards the horizontal approach was epitomized by the Declaration of Alma-Ata adopted at the 1978 International Conference on Primary Health Care held in Kazakhstan (Litsios, 2002) .
9)
Tuberculosis control followed a similar trajectory whereby governments had traditionally launched vertical programs through sanatoria, and international health organizations launched prevention campaigns following the dissemination of the Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine in the mid-1940s (Brimnes, 2007) . Anti-tuberculosis drugs were discovered through the late 1940s, but building and running sanatoria was an expensive option and WHO recognized in as early as the mid-1950s that a vertical approach to tuberculosis control would not be economically feasible in developing countries. In an effort to deliver treatment to large numbers of the population in a cost-effective manner, WHO developed and disseminated the 'community approach,' a method which premised on the establishment of centralized networks of public health infrastructure as a prerequisite for disease control (Amrith, 2006: 149-165; Brimnes, 2016: 183-241 According to his sources, it was estimated that the annual economic losses due to tuberculosis and malaria surpassed the national budget.
14) To illustrate the seriousness of the tuberculosis problem, Leppo provided various statistical information. He presented various types of data, including some basic death counts due to tuberculosis dating back to the mid-1920s, as well as more contemporary data (mostly collected in 1947) which were comparatively more intricate (Table 1) . For instance, the number of deaths were closely monitored by province, sex, age, and type of tuberculosis (depending of which part of the body it affected); data on prevalence used both Mantoux skin tests and pulmonary X-ray, and were categorized into rates found among orphans, schoolchildren, college students, industrial laborers, and office employees. However, in the first line of the report, Leppo remarked "no statistics concerning the incidence of tuberculosis are available as this disease has never been included in the list of reportable however, was distinct in that it stressed on legal enforcement and punitive action against defaulters. The Department of Wisaeng was placed under the Bureau of the Police, and the brutal and coercive activities of the colonial sanitation police were justified under the disguise of enlightenment, modernity, and civility. Wisaeng, in other words, was a demonstration of the ultimate power and regulatory nature of the colonial state that aimed to surveille and govern the daily lives of the public. (Shin, D., 1997: 50, 325-332; Park, Y., 2005: 29-30, 330-372) . Another characteristic of the bogeon administration was that it promoted the provision of basic healthcare services through private practice physicians (Shin, O., 1989: 92-93; Shin, J., 2000) . This approach to public health was in fact instrumental for Cold War ideological propaganda and emphasizing the superiority of American ideals of democracy and liberalism. 16) As
Military Governor of South Korea, Lieutenant General John Reed Hodge stated in a public speech he gave in 1946 while commemorating the first anniversary of the American military government:
We have been running hospitals and medical facilities, educating professionals capable of managing these medical facilities and supplies, and producing a large quantity of drugs based on the Korean people's science and technology. We're fighting against cholera with these Korean-produced drugs. We did not issue revolutionary statements or decrees in order to force subjugation. That kind of coercive method seems to produce impressive quantitative results but it is unsound and unjust as it is not based on the representation of the people's will.
17)
Foregrounding political ideology, General Hodge undermined the progress being made in North Korea, while also diverting the attention away from the slow progress in South Korea's public health sector.
In reality, the lack of medical manpower and health facilities left the 16) The implications of this approach to public health become more conspicuous when juxtaposed with the path taken in North Korea, where government also abolished the colonial wisaeng police and adopted the term bogeon in its bureaucratic organization, but it completely revamped the system by prioritizing preventive medicine and nationalizing medical facilities. See Dong-won Shin ( In addition, the government sought to isolate patients in hospitals and sanatoria, but due to the poor financial conditions, was considering provisions of "simple cottage hospitals" instead.
21)
It is plausible that the Korean government at the time was more familiar with the vertical approach for controlling communicable diseases, because it had gained the experience of operating tuberculosis sanatoria throughout the Japanese colonial period (Park, 2013; KNTA, 1998: 306) . In addition, there were also a number of leprosaria, both public and private, throughout the country (Kim, J., 2012 This was indeed a formative period for post-colonial public health in South Korea. While a decolonization process was underway with the conceptual reorientation from wisaeng to bogeon and the bureaucratic removal of police forces from health affairs, the principles of the American health care system-especially its ideological stance against socialized medicine-came to pervade the administrative infrastructure that was as yet far from being fully functional. Leppo described tuberculosis as "the most serious public health problem" for South Korea, when in fact the most serious problem was the nation's public health infrastructure itself.
Without political and financial support from either the military or the new government, the impact of the bogeon administration on health services were highly limited.
23) Namely, the National Tuberculosis Sanatorium, the Transportation Ministry's Sanatorium in Masan, and the Korean Red Cross Sanatorium in Incheon. 24) "Public Health in Korea," p. 15, WP/RC2/2, WHO Archives. 25) "Public Health in Korea," pp. 21-22, WP/RC2/2, WHO Archives.
The Macdonald Report: Calls for Rural Health Units
Despite its much-awaited arrival, WHO's assistance was brought to a halt within just a few months when the Korean War broke out and Leppo and his team were evacuated to Japan.
26) WHO Director-General Brock
Chisholm described the situation on the Peninsula as "a most tragic event"
of the year befalling WHO and the international community. 27) WHO put its independent activities on hold, and began to contribute through providing relief, but it no longer liaised directly with Korean officials. Rather, it coordinated its activities with the Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK) program.
CRIK was answerable to a military unit known as the United Nations Civil
Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK).
28)
The fact that WHO no longer communicated directly with the Ministry but CRIK, a foreign military organization, reflected where the interest for public health lied during conflict. The wartime civil relief program invested little resources on public health infrastructure. Its activities focused instead on short-term relief, such as preventing starvation and controlling epidemics, especially among the refugee population in Daegu and Busan.
Although they managed to make some headway, specifically in introducing mass immunization schemes and sanitation projects such as chlorination of wells, insect control, and DDT application, these activities were intended for the military, not for civilians. Another major structural problem was the lack of local health centers.
The Macdonald Report strongly suggested that more health units should be established across the country to carry out local health work. In fact, the government had established in 1951 roughly 500 health dispensaries, 400 of which were located in rural areas. support these health units.
41)
The third topic that the report stressed was the problem of tuberculosis.
Under the title of "Diseases of Major Social Importance," it listed four diseases-leprosy, venereal diseases, parasitic diseases, and tuberculosisthat had significant implications on the nation's economy and required systematic planning over extended periods. 
Voluntary Health Organizations as Part of Infrastructure
While the government struggled to reinforce its infrastructure during the 1950s, one source of international medical assistance was the Scandinavian Medical Mission, a collaborative project between Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. The three countries' health work in Korea began when they launched medical relief work following the outbreak of the Korean War. 45) The National Medical Center is referred to as a model case in South Korean development history due to its smooth operation despite the many actors involved in its organization and management, and continues to serve as a major public hospital until this day. See Center in Madras, India, showed that patients treated with a combination of two new drugs-isoniazid and PAS, both of which could easily be taken orally from their own homes-made the same progress as those treated in isolation at hospitals. This was a feat for tuberculosis chemotherapy.
Domiciliary chemotherapy meant that the government did not have to spend money on building and maintaining hospital beds, and that healthcare personnel could be replaced with low-skilled auxiliary workers (Raviglione and Pio, 2002: 776) . WHO later noted that these "outstanding"
outcomes of the Madras study, "more than the actual discovery of the that would form the basis of its National Tuberculosis Programmes (NTPs); tuberculosis was a community problem that must, and now could be, addressed within the communities, rather than an individual's problem to be treated at a sanatoria outside of the community. Plan, and began to lay out public health programs in conjunction with economic development, such as family planning campaigns (DiMoia, 2013: 109-144) . Diseases of high prevalence that threatened the wellbeing of the labor force received serious attention, including tuberculosis and parasitism among others (Jung et al., 2016: 167-203) . Of the two, tuberculosis was especially linked with poverty. It was a manifestation of destitute conditions, but was also thought as a cause for them. In general, the military government was keen on developing public health programs to shore up their legitimacy.
On his second visit in 1962, Tao noticed notable changes made under these circumstances. He was "impressed by the cleanliness of the streets, the orderliness of the traffic, the stability of currency, the virtual absence of foreign commodities in the market, and the high working morale of the civil servants." A new Minister of Health and Social Affairs, a doctor with military background, had been appointed (Lee, Y., 2018: 44-45) , and the The Body will be responsible for planning, organizing, executing, supervising, and evaluating the programme… Therefore, in view of its important tasks in direction the national programme, authority in technical as well as administrative matters has to be granted to the Tuberculosis Control Body and its budget made independent. Strong support of this principle has been promised by the Minister.
66)
Under these arrangements and understandings, the Ministry was poised to play more than an administrative role and become more involved in WHO's long-range plans, however, were more than the centralization of tuberculosis control. Centralized direction and execution through the Body was only provisional, until the provincial governments and municipalities became better equipped and more qualified personnel became available. * Graduate School of Science and Technology Policy, KAIST, Korea / E-mail: kyuriakim@ gmail.com ** Corresponding author, Graduate School of Science and Technology Policy, KAIST, Korea / E-mail: parkb@kaist.edu
